Re: GRANT USAGE on FOREIGN SERVER exposes passwords

From: Jim Nasby <Jim(dot)Nasby(at)BlueTreble(dot)com>
To: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>
Cc: Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Noah Yetter <nyetter(at)gmail(dot)com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: GRANT USAGE on FOREIGN SERVER exposes passwords
Date: 2015-02-11 06:24:21
Message-ID: 54DAF595.1080100@BlueTreble.com
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On 2/5/15 10:48 AM, Tom Lane wrote:
> Stephen Frost<sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> writes:
>> >* Robert Haas (robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com) wrote:
>>> >>On Thu, Feb 5, 2015 at 10:48 AM, Stephen Frost<sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> wrote:
>>>> >>>And I thought this was about FDW options and not about dblink, really..
>>> >>The OP is pretty clearly asking about dblink.
>> >I was just pointing out that it was an issue that all FDWs suffer from,
>> >since we don't have any way for an FDW to say "don't show this option",
>> >as discussed.
> The dblink example is entirely uncompelling, given that as you said
> somebody with access to a dblink connection could execute ALTER USER on
> the far end.

Actually, you can eliminate that by not granting direct access to dblink
functions. Instead you create a SECURITY DEFINER function that sanity
checks the SQL you're trying to run and rejects things like ALTER USER.
While you're doing that, you can also lock away the connection
information. A former coworker actually built a system that does this,
at least to a limited degree.
--
Jim Nasby, Data Architect, Blue Treble Consulting
Data in Trouble? Get it in Treble! http://BlueTreble.com

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