From: | Dave Page <dpage(at)pgadmin(dot)org> |
---|---|
To: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
Cc: | Albe Laurenz <laurenz(dot)albe(at)wien(dot)gv(dot)at>, Andrew Dunstan <andrew(at)dunslane(dot)net>, mlortiz <mlortiz(at)uci(dot)cu>, Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: Rejecting weak passwords |
Date: | 2009-09-28 15:48:21 |
Message-ID: | 937d27e10909280848m29148852m175aef21a76f5a4a@mail.gmail.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Mon, Sep 28, 2009 at 4:38 PM, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> wrote:
> "Albe Laurenz" <laurenz(dot)albe(at)wien(dot)gv(dot)at> writes:
>> Tom Lane wrote:
>>> Actually there's a much bigger problem with asking the backend to reject
>>> weak passwords: what ya gonna do with a pre-MD5'd string? Which is
>>> exactly what the backend is going to always get, in a security-conscious
>>> environment.
>
>> I'm thinking of the case where somebody changes his or her
>> password interactively on the command line, with pgAdmin III,
>> or similar. People would hardly use the above in that case,
>
> Really? If pgAdmin has a password-change function that doesn't use
> client-side password encryption then somebody should file a bug against
> it. Sending unencrypted passwords exposes the password at least to the
> postmaster logfile. createuser has been doing encryption, unless
> specifically commanded not to, for a long time.
pgAdmin MD5's the passwords if you use the GUI to change them, or when
add a user. It doesn't make any attempt to parse the SQL if you enter
it yourself in the query tool though (nor is it going to).
--
Dave Page
EnterpriseDB UK: http://www.enterprisedb.com
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