Tim Holloway <mtsinc(at)southeast(dot)net> writes:
>> Note that logging into a table is harder than you might think.
> I guess I should have mentioned - at least in its initial incarnation,
> cowardice forbids me to attempt reading or writing PostgreSQL tables
> directly. The logfile design is designed to be text and
> customizable. If one of those custom formats just happens to look like
> loadable data, well..... :)
Yeah, someone else suggested writing to a textfile and then having a
cron task or something like that load the data into a table later on.
That seems workable, but you'd need some answer to the following
problem. Suppose that for some reason (like trying to diagnose a
transient problem) the log level is currently set high enough so that
every "insert" command generates a log entry. The appointed hour
comes 'round and your cron task fires off. Each time it copies data
out of the logfile into the database, it is itself adding at least one
more entry to the logfile. Can you say "infinite loop"?
I can think of a couple of possible workarounds, but the one that seems
most natural is to let the logging task override the system-wide logging
level and set its own log level to something low. That ties right in
with your followup comment:
> For simple things like log levels, though, I'd still like feedback on
> desirablility and feasibility of altering basic logging options though
> (authorized!) frontends.
I think you were thinking here of altering the system-wide level through
a frontend command, but what I'm envisioning is allowing an SQL client
to alter the log level for its own particular backend *without* any
Even that ability might need to be restricted to suitably-privileged
users, else it could be used to "fly under the radar" of an admin who
was using logging for security purposes. Perhaps I'm being overly
paranoid, though. There are probably only a few message types that
might be of interest for security purposes, so maybe we could define the
filtering commands in such a way that those messages are not disablable
from a client. Anyone else have strong feelings about this?
>> No, it should definitely not be part of pg_hba.conf, it should
>> be a separate configuration file. (pg_hba.conf has a syntax too
>> simple to be easily extensible.)
> Of more concern to me was that I THINK I saw pg_hba.conf being
> rescanned whenever security was tested.
That's true, pg_hba.conf is currently reread on each connection attempt.
We probably ought to try to avoid that... but in any case I think there
are obvious security reasons for keeping access authorization info
strictly separate from other configuration data.
> Good point, but it was the second item on the message
> override line:
> 101 INFO "Server started"
Oops, I missed that...
regards, tom lane
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