> > "The \l command should only list databases that the current user is
> > authorized for, the \du command should only list users authorized for the
> > current database (and perhaps only superusers should get even that much
> > information), etc. Perhaps it is possible to set PG to do this, but that
> > should probably be the default."
Seem reasonable. Why not prevent normal users to dig on the pg_catalog? What is the impact of it?
> Well, you can just go SELECT * FROM pg_database; so fixing \l won't do
> I too would like to see more security in this respect, but it will be
> difficult if not impossible to implement methinks...
Why is it "impossible"?
Euler Taveira de Oliveira
euler (at) ufgnet.ufg.br
Desenvolvedor Web e Administrador de Sistemas
UFGNet - Universidade Federal de Goiás
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