> Bear Giles writes:
> > Third patch - adds client verification of server certificate.
> > This has some POSIX-isms that need to be expanded for Windows
> > and Mac clients, and identifies (but does not fix) a problem
> > on the backend that could be used for "denial of service"
> > attacks on the current backend.
> What happens if I don't want to use this feature
Use SSH tunnels. The code is written with the presumption that
anyone using SSL wants a secure session, and that includes
confidentiality, message integrity and endpoint authentication.
If they just want confidentiality, SSH tunnels are a lot easier
to set up.
> and/or I don't have the certificates set up?
If they want secure sessions, they'll invest the time in setting
up the certificates.
> Why are errors from getpwuid() thrown away, isn't
> that a risk?
My code keeps going back and forth on that. There's a lot less
risk than usual because the argument is from getuid(), not something
like a file ownership which can contain an arbitrary number.
Then again, it's possible for root to setuid() to a number that
doesn't have an /etc/passwd entry so there's a remote risk of
> Please use MAXPGPATH to size buffers for file names.
Legacy code again.
> What exactly is the "problem" you identify? I couldn't make it out.
If the SSL negotiations don't complete for any reason, the server
hiccups. This would tend to annoy other users who see their connections
drop, especially if some jerk is running a program that retries to
establish a connection every 10 seconds or so.
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